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Abstract—Internet worm infection continues to be one of top security threats and has been widely used by botnets to recruit new
bots. In this work, we attempt to quantify the infection ability of individual hosts and reveal the key characteristics of the underlying
topology formed by worm infection, i.e., the number of children and the generation of the worm infection family tree. Specifically, we
first apply probabilistic modeling methods and a sequential growth model to analyze the infection tree of a wide class of worms. We
analytically and empirically find that the number of children has asymptotically a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. As a result,
on average half of infected hosts never compromise any vulnerable host, over 98% of infected hosts have no more than five children,
and a small portion of infected hosts have a large number of children. We also discover that the generation follows closely a Poisson
distribution and the average path length of the worm infection family tree increases approximately logarithmically with the total number
of infected hosts. Next, we empirically study the infection structure of localized-scanning worms and surprisingly find that most of
the above observations also apply to localized-scanning worms. Finally, we apply our findings to develop bot detection methods and
study potential countermeasures for a botnet (e.g., Conficker C) that uses scan-based peer discovery to form a P2P-based botnet.
Specifically, we demonstrate that targeted detection that focuses on the nodes with the largest number of children is an efficient way to
expose bots. For example, our simulation shows that when 3.125% nodes are examined, targeted detection can reveal 22.36% bots.
However, we also point out that future botnets may limit the maximum number of children to weaken targeted detection, without greatly
slowing down the speed of worm infection.
Index Terms—Worm infection family tree, botnet, probabilistic modeling, simulation, topology, and detection.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet epidemics are malicious software that can self-
propagate across the Internet, i.e., compromise vulnera-
ble hosts and use them to attack other victims. Internet
epidemics include viruses, worms, and bots. The past
more than twenty years have witnessed the evolution of
Internet epidemics. Viruses infect machines through ex-
changed emails or disks, and dominated the 1980s and
1990s. Internet active worms compromise vulnerable hosts
by automatically propagating through the Internet and
have caused much attention since the Code Red and Nimda
worms in 2001. Botnets are zombie networks controlled
by attackers through Internet relay chat (IRC) systems
(e.g., GT Bot) or peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (e.g., Storm) to
execute coordinated attacks and have become the number
one threat to the Internet in recent years. Since Internet
epidemics have evolved to become more and more virulent
and stealthy, they have been identified as one of the top
security problems [1].
The main difference between worms and botnets lies in
that worms emphasize the procedures of infecting targets
and propagating among vulnerable hosts, whereas botnets
focus on the mechanisms of organizing the network of com-
promised computers and setting out coordinated attacks.
Most botnets, however, still apply worm-scanning methods
to recruit new bots or collect network information [2], [3],
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[4], [5]. Moreover, although many P2P-based botnets use
the existing P2P networks to build a bootstrap procedure,
Conficker C forms a P2P botnet through scan-based peer
discovery [6], [7]. Specifically, Conficker C searches for new
peers by randomly scanning the entire Internet address
space. As a result, the way that Conficker C constructs
a P2P-based botnet is in principle the same as worm
scanning/infection. Therefore, characterizing the structure
of worm infection is important and imperative for defend-
ing against current and future epidemics such as Internet
worms and Conficker C like P2P-based botnets.
Modeling Internet worm infection has been focused on
the macro level. Most, if not all, mathematical models study
the total number of infected hosts over time [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [2]. The models of the micro level of worm
infection, however, have been investigated little. The micro-
level models can provide more insights into the infection
ability of individual compromised hosts and the underlying
topologies formed by worm infection. A key micro-level
information is “who infects whom” or the worm infection
family tree. When a host infects another host, they form
a “father-and-son” relationship, which is represented by a
directed edge in a graph formed by worm infection. Hence,
the procedure of worm propagation constructs a directed
tree where patient zero is the root and the infected hosts
that do not compromise any vulnerable host are leaves
(see Fig. 1). To the best of our knowledge, there is yet no
mathematical model for reflecting the structure of such a
tree.
The goal of this work is to characterize the Internet worm
infection family tree, i.e., the topology formed by worm
infection. For such a tree, we are particularly interested in
two metrics:
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Fig. 1. A worm tree.
• Number of children: For a randomly selected node in
the tree, how many children does it have? This metric
represents the infection ability of individual hosts.
• Generation: For a randomly selected node in the tree,
which generation (or level) does it belong to? This
metric indicates the average path length of the graph
formed by worm infection.
These two metrics reflect the underlying topology formed
by worm infection, called the “worm tree” in short. For
example, if the worm tree is a random graph, each host
would infect a similar number of targets; and the average
path length would increase approximately logarithmically
with the total number of nodes [13], [14]. If the worm tree
has a power-law topology, only a very small number of
hosts infect a large number of children, and a majority of
hosts infect none or few children; and the average path
length would also increase approximately logarithmically
with the total number of nodes [13]. Moreover, power-
law topologies are robust to random node removal, but
are vulnerable to the removal of a small portion of nodes
with highest node degrees. However, random graphs are
robust to both removal schemes [13]. Therefore, studying
the structure of the worm tree can help provide insights on
detecting and defending against botnets such as Conficker
C.
To study these two metrics analytically, we apply proba-
bilistic modeling methods and derive the joint probability
distribution of the number of children and the generation
through a sequential growth model. Specifically, we start
from a worm tree with only patient zero and add new
nodes into the worm tree sequentially. We then investigate
the relationship between the two worm trees before and
after a new node is added. From the joint distribution,
we analyze the marginal distributions of the number of
children and the generation. We also develop closed-form
approximations to both marginal distributions and the joint
distribution. Different from other models that characterize
the dynamics of worm propagation (e.g., the total number
of infected hosts over time), our sequential growth model
aims at capturing the main features of the topology formed
by worm infection (e.g., the number of children and the
generation).
As a first attempt, we analyze the worm tree formed by
a wide class of worms such as random-scanning worms
[8], routable-scanning worms [15], [9], importance-scanning
worms [16], OPT-STATICworms [17], and SUBOPT-STATIC
worms [17]. For these worms, a new victim is compro-
mised by each existing infected host with equal probability.
We then verify the analytical results through simulations.
We also employ simulations to investigate worm infection
using localized scanning [18], [19]. Finally, we apply our
analysis and observations to develop methods for detecting
bots and study potential countermeasures for a botnet (e.g.,
Conficker C) that uses scan-based peer discovery to form a
P2P-based botnet.
Through both analytical and empirical study, we make
several contributions from this research as follows. First,
if a worm uses a scanning method for which a new
victim is compromised by each existing infected host with
equal probability, the number of children is shown both
analytically and empirically to have asymptotically a ge-
ometric distribution with parameter 0.5. This means that
on average half of infected hosts never compromise any
target and over 98% of infected hosts have no more than
five children. On the other hand, this also indicates that a
small portion of hosts infect a large number of vulnerable
hosts. Moreover, the generation is demonstrated to closely
follow a Poisson distribution with parameterHn−1, where
n is the number of nodes and Hn is the n-th harmonic
number [20]. This means that the average path length of
the worm tree increases approximately logarithmically with
the number of nodes. Second, if a worm uses localized
scanning, the number of children still has approximately
a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. Moreover, the
generation still follows a Poisson distribution, but with
the parameter depending on the probability of local scan-
ning. Therefore, most previous observations also apply to
localized-scanning worms. Finally, a direct application of
the observations of the worm tree is on the bot detection
in Conficker C like botnets. We show both analytically and
empirically that while randomly examining a small portion
of nodes in a botnet (i.e., random detection) can only expose
a limited number of bots, examining the nodes with the
largest number of children (i.e., targeted detection) is much
more efficient in detecting bots. For example, our simula-
tion shows that when 3.125% nodes are examined, random
detection exposes totally 9.10% bots, whereas targeted de-
tection reveals 22.36% bots. On the other hand, we also
point out that future botnets can potentially use a simple
method to weaken the performance of targeted detection,
without greatly slowing down the speed of worm infection.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
in understanding and exploiting the topology formed by
worm infection quantitatively.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 presents our sequential growth model and as-
sumptions used in analyzing the worm tree. Section 3 gives
our analysis on the worm tree. Section 4 uses simulations
to verify the analytical results and provide observations on
the worm tree using the localized-scanning method. Section
5 further develops bot detection methods and studies po-
3tential countermeasures by future botnets. Finally, Section
6 discusses the related work, and Section 7 concludes this
paper.
2 WORM TREE AND SEQUENTIAL GROWTH
MODEL
In this section, we provide the background on the worm
tree, and present the assumptions and the growth model.
An example of a worm tree is given in Fig. 1. Here,
patient zero is the root and belongs to generation 0. The
tail of an arrow is from the “father” or the infector, whereas
the head of an arrow points to the “son” or the infectee.
If a father belongs to generation i, then its children lie
in generation i + 1. In a worm tree with n nodes, we
use Ln(i, j) (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1) to denote the number
of nodes that have i children and belong to generation
j. Note that
∑n−1
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 Ln(i, j) = n. We also use Cn(i)
(i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n− 1) to denote the number of nodes that
have i children and Gn(j) (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n− 1) to denote
the number of nodes in generation j. Moreover, Ln(i, j),
Cn(i), and Gn(j) are random variables. Thus, we define
pn(i, j) =
E[Ln(i,j)]
n
, representing the joint distribution of
the number of children and the generation. Similarly, we
define cn(i) =
E[Cn(i)]
n
to represent the marginal distribu-
tion of the number of children and gn(j) =
E[Gn(j)]
n
to
represent the marginal distribution of the generation. Note
that cn(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 pn(i, j) and gn(j) =
∑n−1
i=0 pn(i, j).
Although we model worm infection as a tree, differ-
ent worm trees can show very different structures. Fig. 2
demonstrates two extreme cases of worm trees. Specifically,
in Fig. 2 (a), each infected host compromises one and only
one host except the last infected host. In this case, if the
total number of nodes is n, Cn(0) = 1, and Cn(1) = n− 1,
which lead to cn(0) =
1
n
and cn(1) =
n−1
n
≈ 1 when
n is large. That is, almost each node has one and only
one child. Moreover, Gn(j) = 1, j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1,
which means that gn(j) =
1
n
. Thus, the average path length
is
∑n−1
j=0 j · gn(j) =
n−1
2 ∼ O(n). That is, the average
path length increases linearly with the number of nodes.
Comparatively, Fig. 2 (b) shows another case where all hosts
(except patient zero) are infected by patient zero. For the
distribution of the number of children, cn(n − 1) =
1
n
,
and cn(0) =
n−1
n
≈ 1 when n is large, indicating that
almost every node has no child. For the distribution of the
generation, gn(0) =
1
n
, and gn(1) =
n−1
n
, which leads to
that the average path length is n−1
n
≈ 1 when n is large.
Thus, the path length is close to a constant of 1. In this
work, we attempt to identify the structure of the worm
tree formed by Internet worm infection.
To study the worm tree analytically, in this paper we
make several assumptions and considerations. First, to
simplify the model, we assume that infected hosts have
the same scanning rate. This assumption is removed in
Section 4, where we use simulations to study the effect of
the variation of scanning rates on the worm tree. Second,
we consider a wide class of worms for which a new
Generation 0
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(a) Extreme case 1.
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Fig. 2. Two extreme cases of worm trees.
victim is compromised by each existing infected host with
equal probability. Such worms include random-scanning
worms, routable-scanning worms, importance-scanning
worms, OPT-STATIC worms, and SUBOPT-STATIC worms.
Random scanning selects targets in the IPv4 address space
randomly and has been the main scanning method for both
worms and botnets [8], [3]; routable scanning finds victims
in the routable IPv4 address space [15], [9]; and impor-
tance scanning probes subnets according to the vulnerable-
host distribution [16]. OPT-STATIC and SUBOPT-STATIC
are optimal and suboptimal scanning methods that are
proposed in [17] to minimize the number of worm scans
required to reach a predetermined fraction of vulnerable
hosts. In Section 4.3, we extend our study to localized
scanning, which preferentially searches for targets in the
local subnet and has also been used by real worms [18],
[19]. Third, we consider the classic susceptible → infected
(SI) model, ignoring the cases that an infected host can be
cleaned and becomes vulnerable again, or can be patched
and becomes invulnerable. The SI model assumes that once
infected, a host remains infected. Such a simple model has
been widely applied in studying worm infection [8], [9],
[21], [17], and presents the worst case scenario. Fourth, we
assume that there is no re-infection. That is, if an infected
host is hit by a worm scan, this host will not be further
re-infected. As a result, every infected host has one and
only one father except for patient zero, and the resulting
graph formed by worm infection is a tree. Fifth, we assume
that the worm starts from one infected host, i.e., patient
zero or a hitlist size of 1. When the hitlist size is larger
than 1, the underlying infection topology is a worm forest,
instead of a worm tree. Our analysis, however, can easily
be extended to model the worm forest. Finally, to simplify
the analysis, we assume that no two nodes are added to
the worm tree at the same time. That is, no two vulnerable
hosts are infected simultaneously. We relax this assumption
in Section 4 where simulations are performed.
Based on these considerations and assumptions, the se-
quential growth model of a worm tree works as follows:
We consider a fixed sequence of infected hosts (i.e., nodes)
4v1, v2, · · · and inductively construct a random worm tree
(Tn)n≥1, where n is the number of nodes and T1 has only
patient zero. Infecting a new host is equivalent to adding a
new node into the existing worm tree. Hence, given Tn−1,
Tn is formed by adding node vn together with an edge
directed from an existing node vf to vn. According to the
assumption, vf is randomly chosen among the n− 1 nodes
in the tree, i.e., Pr(f = k) = 1
n−1 , k = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1.
Note that such a growth model and its variations have
been widely used in studying topology generators [22], [23].
In this paper, we apply this model to characterize worm
infection.
3 MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the worm tree through mathe-
matical analysis. Specifically, we first derive the joint dis-
tribution of the number of children and the generation, i.e.,
pn(i, j), by applying probabilistic methods. We then use
pn(i, j) to analyze two marginal distributions, i.e., cn(i) and
gn(j), and obtain their closed-form approximations. Finally,
we find a closed-form approximation to pn(i, j).
3.1 Joint Distribution
For a worm tree with only patient zero (i.e., n = 1), since
L1(0, 0) = 1 with probability 1, p1(0, 0) = 1. Similarly,
for a worm tree with n = 2, it is evident that L2(1, 0) =
L2(0, 1) = 1. Thus, p2(1, 0) = p2(0, 1) =
1
2 . We now
consider pn(i, j) (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n−1) when n ≥ 3. Specifically,
we study two cases:
(1) pn(0, j), i.e., the proportion of the number of leaves
in generation j in Tn. Assume that Tn−1 is given, and
there are Ln−1(0, j) leaves in generation j and totally
Gn−1(j − 1) =
∑n−2
i=0 Ln−1(i, j − 1) nodes in generation
j − 1. Note that we have extended the notation so that
Gn−1(−1) = Ln−1(i,−1) = 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. When a
new node vn is added, vn becomes a leaf of Tn. If vn is
connected to one of existing nodes in generation j − 1,
vn belongs to generation j; and the probability of such
an event is
Gn−1(j−1)
n−1 . Moreover, if a leaf in generation
j in Tn−1 connects to vn, this node is no longer a leaf
and now has one child; and the probability of this event is
Ln−1(0,j)
n−1 . Therefore, we can obtain the stochastic recurrence
of Ln(0, j):
Ln(0, j) =


Ln−1(0, j) + 1, w.p.
Gn−1(j−1)
n−1
Ln−1(0, j)− 1, w.p.
Ln−1(0,j)
n−1
Ln−1(0, j), otherwise.
(1)
Given Tn−1 (i.e., Ln−1(0, j) and Gn−1(j − 1)), the con-
ditional expected value of Ln(0, j) is [Ln−1(0, j) + 1] ·
Gn−1(j−1)
n−1 + [Ln−1(0, j)− 1] ·
Ln−1(0,j)
n−1 + Ln−1(0, j) ·[
1− Gn−1(j−1)+Ln−1(0,j)
n−1
]
, i.e.,
E[Ln(0, j)|Tn−1] =
n−2
n−1Ln−1(0, j) +
1
n−1Gn−1(j − 1). (2)
Applying E[Ln(0, j)] = E[E[Ln(0, j)|Tn−1]] (i.e., the law of
total expectation), we obtain
E[Ln(0, j)] =
n−2
n−1E[Ln−1(0, j)] +
1
n−1E[Gn−1(j − 1)]. (3)
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Fig. 3. Joint distribution of the number of children and the
generation (n = 2000).
Using the definitions pn(0, j) =
E[Ln(0,j)]
n
and gn−1(j −
1) = E[Gn−1(j−1)]
n−1 =
∑n−2
i=0 pn−1(i, j − 1), the above equa-
tion leads to
pn(0, j) =
n−2
n
pn−1(0, j) +
1
n
gn−1(j − 1) (4)
= n−2
n
pn−1(0, j) +
1
n
∑n−2
i=0 pn−1(i, j − 1).(5)
(2) pn(i, j), 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1. Given Ln−1(i, j) and Ln−1(i−
1, j) in Tn−1, we study Ln(i, j) in Tn. When the new node
vn is added into Tn−1, vn is connected to a node with i− 1
children and in generation j with probability Ln−1(i−1,j)
n−1 ,
or is connected to a node with i children and in generation
j with probability Ln−1(i,j)
n−1 . Thus, in Tn,
Ln(i, j) =


Ln−1(i, j) + 1, w.p.
Ln−1(i−1,j)
n−1
Ln−1(i, j)− 1, w.p.
Ln−1(i,j)
n−1
Ln−1(i, j), otherwise.
(6)
This relationship leads to
E[Ln(i, j)|Tn−1] =
n−2
n−1Ln−1(i, j)+
1
n−1Ln−1(i−1, j). (7)
Therefore,
E[Ln(i, j)] =
n−2
n−1E[Ln−1(i, j)] +
1
n−1E[Ln−1(i− 1, j)]. (8)
That is,
pn(i, j) =
n−2
n
pn−1(i, j) +
1
n
pn−1(i − 1, j). (9)
Summarizing the above two cases, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 1: When n ≥ 3, the joint distribution of the
number of children and the generation in a worm tree Tn
follows
pn(i, j) =
{
n−2
n
pn−1(0, j) +
1
n
gn−1(j − 1), i = 0
n−2
n
pn−1(i, j) +
1
n
pn−1(i− 1, j), otherwise,
(10)
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1.
5Theorem 1 provides a way to calculate pn(i, j) recur-
sively from p2(i, j). Fig. 3 shows a snapshot of pn(i, j)
when n = 2000. It can be seen that when the genera-
tion is specified (i.e., j is fixed), pn(i, j) is a monotonous
function and decreases quickly as i increases. On the
other hand, when the number of children is given (i.e.,
i is fixed), pn(i, j) has a bell shape. Moreover, since∑10
i=0
∑15
j=0 pn(i, j) = 0.9976, most nodes do not have a
large number of children, and the worm tree does not have
a large average path length.
3.2 Number of Children
We use pn(i, j) to derive the marginal distribution of the
number of children, i.e., cn(i). Similarly, we study two
cases:
(1) cn(0), i.e., the proportion of the number of leaves in
Tn. Since cn(0) =
∑n−1
j=0 pn(0, j) and
∑n−1
j=0 gn−1(j−1) = 1,
we obtain the recursive relationship of cn(0) from Equation
(4):
cn(0) =
n−2
n
cn−1(0) +
1
n
. (11)
Moreover, note that c2(0) =
1
2 . If we assume that cn−1(0) =
1
2 , we can obtain by induction that
cn(0) =
1
2 . (12)
This indicates that no matter how many nodes are in the
worm tree, on average half of nodes are leaves, i.e., on
average 50% of infected hosts never compromise any target.
(2) cn(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. From Equation (9) and cn(i) =∑n−1
j=0 pn(i, j), we find the recurrence of cn(i) as follows
cn(i) =
n−2
n
cn−1(i) +
1
n
cn−1(i− 1). (13)
Summarizing the above two cases, we have the following
theorem on the distribution of the number of children:
Theorem 2: When n ≥ 3, the distribution of the number
of children in a worm tree Tn follows
cn(i) =
{
1
2 , i = 0
n−2
n
cn−1(i) +
1
n
cn−1(i− 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
(14)
From Theorem 2, we can derive the statistical properties
of the number of children as follows.
Corollary 1: When n ≥ 1, the expectation and the vari-
ance of the number of children are
En[C] =
∑n−1
i=0 i · cn(i) =
n−1
n
(15)
Varn[C] =
∑n−1
i=0 (i − En[C])
2
· cn(i) = 2−
n−1
n2
− 2Hn
n
,
(16)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
is the n-th harmonic number [20].
The proof of Corollary 1 is given in Appendix 1. One
intuitive way to derive En[C] is that in worm tree Tn, there
are n − 1 directed edges and n nodes. Thus, the average
number of edges (i.e, the average number of children)
of a node is n−1
n
. Moreover, since Hn is O(1 + lnn),
lim
n→∞
En[C] = 1, and lim
n→∞
Varn[C] = 2.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the number of children.
Theorem 2 also leads to a simple closed-form expression
of the distribution of the number of children when n is very
large, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: When n→∞, the number of children has a
geometric distribution with parameter 12 , i.e.,
c(i) = lim
n→∞
cn(i) =
(1
2
)i+1
, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (17)
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in Appendix 2. Corol-
lary 2 indicates that when n is very large, cn(i) decreases
approximately exponentially with a decay constant of ln 2
as the number of children increases.
We further study when both n and i are finite and
large, how cn(i) varies with n, i.e., how the tail of the
distribution of the number of children changes with n. First,
note that c3(0) =
1
2 , c3(1) =
1
3 , and c3(2) =
1
6 . Thus,
from Equation (13), we can prove by induction that cn(i)
(n ≥ 3) is a decreasing function of i, i.e., cn(i) < cn(i− 1),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Next, putting this inequality into
Equation (13), we have cn(i) >
n−1
n
cn−1(i). Hence, when
n is very large, n−1
n
≈ 1, and cn(i) > cn−1(i), which
indicates that the tail of cn(i) increases with n. Fig. 4 verifies
this result, showing cn(i) obtained from Theorem 2 when
n = 1000, 2000, 5000, and 20000, as well as the geometric
distribution with parameter 0.5 obtained from Corollary
2. Note that the y-axis uses log-scale. It can be seen that
when n increases from 1000 to 20000, the tail of cn(i) also
increases to approach the tail of the geometric distribution.
Moreover, it is shown that the geometric distribution well
approximates the distribution of the number of children
when n is large.
3.3 Generation
Next, we derive the generation distribution (i.e., gn(j)) in a
similar manner to the case of cn(i). Using Theorem 1 and
gn(j) =
∑n−1
i=0 pn(i, j), we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3: When n ≥ 3, the distribution of the genera-
tion in a worm tree Tn follows
gn(j) =
n−1
n
gn−1(j) +
1
n
gn−1(j − 1), 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, (18)
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Fig. 5. Distribution of the generation.
where gn−1(−1) = 0.
Theorem 3 gives a method to calculate the distribution
of the generation recursively. Moreover, from Theorem 3,
we can derive the statistical properties of the generation
distribution in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: When n ≥ 1, the expectation and the vari-
ance of the generation are
En[G] =
∑n−1
j=0 j · gn(j) = Hn − 1. (19)
Varn[G] =
∑n−1
j=0 (j − En[G])
2
· gn(j) = Hn −Hn,2, (20)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
and Hn,2 =
∑n
i=1
1
i2
.
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in Appendix 3. From
Corollary 3, we have some interesting observations. Since
Hn is O(1 + lnn) and H∞,2 = ζ(2) =
pi2
6 ≈ 1.645 is the
Riemann zeta function of 2 [24], both En[G] and Varn[G]
are O(1+ lnn). This indicates that the average path length
of the worm tree (i.e., En[G]) increases approximately loga-
rithmically with n. Moreover, when n→∞, lim
n→∞
En[G]−
lnn = γ − 1, and lim
n→∞
Varn[G] − lnn = γ − ζ(2), where
γ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant [25]. Therefore,
when n is large, En[G] ≈ Varn[G]. Furthermore, we can use
Theorem 3 to obtain a closed-form approximation to gn(j)
as follows.
Corollary 4: When n is very large, the generation distri-
bution gn(j) can be approximated by a Poisson distribution
with parameter λn = En[G] = Hn − 1. That is,
gn(j) ≈
λjn
j! e
−λn , 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. (21)
The proof of Corollary 4 is given in Appendix 4. Fig. 5
verifies Corollary 4, showing gn(j) obtained from Theorem
3 when n = 1000, 2000, 5000, and 20000, as well as
the Poisson distribution with parameter En[G]. It can be
seen that when n is large, the Poisson distribution fits the
generation distribution closely.
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Fig. 6. Parity plot of the approximation to the joint distribution
(n = 2000).
3.4 Approximation to the Joint Distribution
Finally, we derive a closed-form approximation to the joint
distribution pn(i, j). From Equation (9), we can see that
when n→∞, pn(i, j) = pn−1(i, j), which yields
pn(i, j) =
1
2pn(i− 1, j). (22)
Hence, we can obtain
pn(i, j) =
(
1
2
)i
pn(0, j) ≈
(
1
2
)i+1
gn(j). (23)
Since when n is very large, gn(j) follows closely the Poisson
distribution as in Corollary 4,
pn(i, j) ≈
(
1
2
)i+1
·
λjn
j! e
−λn , 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1, (24)
where λn = Hn − 1. The above derivation also shows
that when n is very large, the number of children and the
generation are almost independent random variables.
Fig. 6 shows the parity plot of the approximation to the
joint distribution when n = 2000. In the figure, the x-axis
is the actual pn(i, j) obtained from Theorem 1, and the y-
axis is the approximated pn(i, j) from Equation (24), where
0 ≤ i, j ≤ 30. It can be seen that most points are on or near
the diagonal line, indicating that the approximation to the
joint distribution is reasonable.
4 SIMULATIONS AND VERIFICATION
In this section, we study the worm infection structure
through simulations. As far as we know, there is no publicly
available data to show the real worm tree and verify our an-
alytical results. Moreover, real experiments in a controlled
environment are impractical for this study since the closed-
form approximations are derived based on the assumption
that the number of nodes is very large. Therefore, we apply
empirical simulations. Specifically, we first simulate the
infection structure of the Code Red v2 worm and then
study the effects of important parameters on the worm tree.
Finally, we extend our simulation to localized-scanning
worms.
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Fig. 7. Simulating the infection structure of the Code Red v2 worm (n0 = 360000).
4.1 Code Red v2 Worm Verification
We simulate the propagation of the Code Red v2 worm
by using and extending the simulator in [26]. Specifically,
the simulator considers a discrete-time system and mimics
the random-scanning behavior of infected hosts during
each discrete time interval. Moreover, the parameter setting
is based on the Code Red v2 worm’s characteristics. For
example, the vulnerable population is n0 = 360, 000, and a
newly infected host is assigned with a scanning rate of 358
scans/min. Detailed information about how the parameters
are chosen can be found in Section VII of [27]. We then
extend the simulator to track the worm infection structure
by adding the information of the number of children and
the generation to each infected host. Moreover, we set the
time unit to 20 seconds and start our simulation at time tick
0 with patient zero. Note that we remove the assumption
used in the sequential growth model that no two hosts are
compromised at the same time. That is, multiple hosts can
be compromised at one time tick. Moreover, all new victims
of the current time tick start scanning at the next time tick.
The simulation results (mean ± standard deviation) are
obtained from 100 independent runs with different seeds
and are presented in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7(a) shows the distribution of the number of children,
comparing the simulation results of cn(i) for n = n0/4,
n0, and 4n0 with the geometric distribution obtained from
Corollary 2. Note that the y-axis uses the log-scale. The
dotted line represents the standard deviation that goes into
the negative territory. It can be seen that the distribution
of the number of children can be well approximated by the
geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. This implies that
cn(i) decreases approximately exponentially with a decay
constant of ln 2. Specifically, in all three cases, on average
50.0% of the infected hosts do not have children, about
98.4% of them have no more than five children, and 0.1%
of them have no less than ten children. We also calculate
the expectation and the variance of the number of children
from the simulation and find that they are identical to
the analytical results obtained from Corollary 1. Fig. 7(b)
demonstrates the generation distribution, comparing the
simulation results of gn(j) for n = n0/4, n0, and 4n0 with
the Poisson distributions with parameter En[G] = Hn − 1
obtained from Corollary 4. It can be seen that the simulation
results of gn(j) closely follow the Poisson distributions for
all three cases. Hence, simulation results verify that the
average path length of the worm tree increases approxi-
mately logarithmically with the total number of infected
hosts. Moreover, we also compute the expectation and the
variance of the generation in simulations and verify the
analytical results in Corollary 3. Fig. 7(c) compares the
measured joint distribution from simulations with the ap-
proximated joint distribution from Equation (24) by using
the parity plot. It can be seen that most points are on or
near the diagonal line, indicating that the approximation
works well.
4.2 Effects of Worm Parameters
Next, we extend our simulator to examine the effects of
three important parameters of worm propagation on the
worm tree: the scanning rate, the scanning rate standard
deviation, and the hitlist size. When a parameter is studied
and varied, we set other parameters to the parameters of
the Code Red v2 worm as used in Section 4.1. The simula-
tion results are obtained from 100 independent simulation
runs and are shown in Fig. 8.
Fig.s 8(a) and (b) show the effect of varying the scanning
rate s (scans/min) from 158 to 558 on the distributions
of the number of children and the generation. Here, the
scanning rate is set to a fixed value for every infected
host, i.e., the scanning rate standard deviation is 0. The
figures also plot the geometric distribution with parameter
0.5 and the Poisson distribution with parameter Hn0 − 1
for reference. It can be seen that the scanning rate does not
affect the worm tree structure.
Fig.s 8(c) and (d) demonstrate the effect of the variation
of the scanning rates among different hosts (i.e., σ). In
our simulation, a newly infected host is assigned with
a scanning rate (scans/min) from a normal distribution
N(358, σ2). The figures show the simulation results when
σ = 0, 100, and 200. It can be seen that while the
scanning rate standard derivation σ has no effect on the
generation distribution, it does affect the distribution of
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Fig. 8. Effects of the scanning rate, the scanning rate standard deviation, and the hitlist size on the distributions of the
number of children and the generation (n0 = 360000).
the number of children. Specifically, when σ increases, the
tail of cn(i) moves upward from the geometric distribution
with parameter 0.5. This is because when σ becomes larger,
the variation of the scanning rate among infected hosts is
greater. That is, there are more hosts with high scanning
rates and also more hosts with low scanning rates. As a
result, those hosts with high scanning rates tend to infect
a large number of hosts, making the tail of cn(i) move up-
ward. However, it is also observed that when σ is not very
large (the case for real worms), the geometric distribution
with parameter 0.5 is still a good approximation.
In Fig.s 8(e) and (f), we show the effect of the hitlist
size on the worm tree. As pointed out in Section 2, when
the hitlist size is greater than 1, the underlying infection
topology is a worm forest with the number of trees equal
to the hitlist size. Moreover, in a worm forest, it is intuitive
that each tree is a smaller version of the single worm
tree of hitlist size 1 and has fewer nodes. Hence, it is not
surprising to see that in Fig. 8(f), the generation distribution
moves leftward when the hitlist size increases. However,
the generation distribution can still be well approximated
by the Poisson distribution with parameter Hnh −1, where
nh is the average number of nodes in a tree. Moreover,
since in each tree the distribution of the number of children
can be approximated by the geometric distribution with
parameter 0.5, in the worm forest cn(i) still follows closely
the same distribution.
4.3 Localized Scanning
Finally, we extend our simulation study to the infection
tree of localized-scanning worms. Different from random
scanning, localized scanning preferentially searches for tar-
gets in the “local” address space [8]. As a result, when a
new node is added to the worm tree, it connects to one
of the existing nodes that are in the same “local” address
space with a higher probability. That is, the growth model
is no longer uniform attachment as studied in Section 3. For
simplicity, in this paper we only consider the /l localized
scanning [19]:
• Local scanning: pa(0 ≤ pa < 1) of the time, a “local”
address with the same first l (0 ≤ l ≤ 32) bits as the
attacking host is chosen as the target.
• Global scanning: 1 − pa of the time, a random address
is chosen.
Note that random scanning can be regarded as a special
case of localized scanning when pa = 0. Moreover, if local
scanning is selected, it can be regarded as random scanning
in a local /l subnet. It has been shown that since the
vulnerable-hosts distribution is highly uneven, localized
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Fig. 9. Simulating the infection structure of the localized-scanning worm (n = 360000, s = 358 scans/min, σ = 0, hitlist =
1, and l = 8).
scanning can spread a worm much faster than random
scanning [18], [21].
We extend our simulator to imitate the spread of
localized-scanning worms. We extract the distribution of
vulnerable hosts in /l subnets from the dataset provided
by DShield [28], [29]. Specifically, we use the dataset in
[29] with port 80 (HTTP) that is exploited by the Code
Red worm to generate the vulnerable-host distribution.
Moreover, we use similar parameters as in Section 4.1 (e.g.,
n = 360000, s = 358 scans/min, σ = 0, and hitlist = 1)
and set the subnet level to 8 (i.e., l = 8). The results are
obtained from 100 independent simulation runs and are
shown in Fig. 9. For each run, patient zero is randomly
chosen from vulnerable hosts.
Fig. 9(a) compares the simulation results of the distribu-
tions of the number of children (i.e., cn(i)) when pa = 0, 0.3,
and 0.6 with the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5.
It is surprising that cn(i) of localized-scanning worms can
still be well approximated by the geometric distribution.
That is, the majority of nodes have few children, whereas a
small portion of compromised hosts infect a large number
of hosts. An intuitive explanation is given as follows. From
Fig. 7(a), it can be seen that the total number of nodes has a
minor effect on cn(i). Hence, if in a /8 subnet the majority
of vulnerable hosts are infected through local scanning, it
is expected that cn(i) of these hosts still closely follows
the geometric distribution since the local scanning can be
regarded as random scanning inside a /8 subnet. Therefore,
both local infection and global infection lead cn(i) towards
the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. On the other
hand, it can also be seen that when pa increases, the tail
of cn(i) moves slightly downward. This is because as pa
increases, more vulnerable hosts are infected through local
scanning. Hence, it is more difficult for an infected host to
find targets after vulnerable hosts in this host’s local subnet
have been exhausted. As a result, when pa increases, fewer
nodes can have a large number of children.
Fig. 9(b) demonstrates that the generation distribution
of localized-scanning worms (i.e., gn(j)) can be well ap-
proximated by the Poisson distribution for the cases of
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Fig. 10. Effect of the subnet level (pa = 0.6).
pa = 0, 0.3, and 0.6. The Poisson parameter, however,
depends not only on n, but also on pa. We further define
λpan = E
pa
n [G] as the expectation of the generation for a
localized-scanning worm with parameter pa. Here, E
pa
n [G]
can be easily estimated from the simulation results of gn(j).
Fig. 9(c) further shows the parity plot of the simulated joint
distribution and the approximated joint distribution from
Equation (24) when pa = 0.6. Since most points are on or
near the diagonal line, the approximation is reasonable.
Moreover, Fig. 10 shows the effect of the subnet level (i.e.,
l) on the distribution of the number of children (i.e., cn(i)).
It can be seen that when l increases, the tail of cn(i) moves
downward. The reason is similar to the argument used in
Fig. 9(a), i.e., as l increases, fewer nodes can infect a large
number of children. However, the figure also demonstrates
that the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 is still a
good approximation to cn(i), especially when the number
of children is not large.
5 APPLICATIONS OF OBSERVATIONS
Our observations on the topologies formed by worm in-
fection have important implications and applications for
both defenders and attackers. For example, we have found
10
that the generation distribution closely follows the Poisson
distribution and the average path length increases approx-
imately logarithmically with the number of nodes. On one
hand, some schemes have been proposed to trace worms
back to their origins through the cooperation between in-
fected hosts [30], [31], and our work quantifies the average
path length that describes a lower bound of the number
of hosts required to cooperate. On the other hand, this
average path length reflects the delay or the effort for a
botmaster to deliver a command to all bots in a P2P-based
botnet like Conficker C, and our results show that the
botnet is scalable and can efficiently forward commands
to a large number of bots. In this section, we focus on the
applications of the distribution of the number of children
for both defenders and attackers. Specifically, we study a
simple and efficient bot detection method in a Conficker
C like P2P-based botnet and consider a countermeasure by
future botnets.
5.1 Bot Detection
We consider a P2P-based botnet formed by worm scan-
ning/infection. That is, once a host infects another host,
they become peers in the resulting P2P-based botnet. When
a defender captures an infected host in a botnet, the de-
fender can process the historic records inside the host or
monitor the traffic going into or out of the host, and will
potentially detect other infected hosts such as the father and
the children of this infected host. Then, our question is that
if a defender can only access a small portion of nodes in
a botnet, how many bots will be detected by the defender.
Moreover, inspired by the random removal and targeted
removal methods used in analyzing the robustness of a
topology [13], here we study two bot detection strategies:
• Random detection: Access bots randomly.
• Targeted detection: Access bots that have the largest
number of children.
Analytically, we suppose that a defender can access a
small ratio of bots in a botnet. We assume that an accessed
bot exposes itself, its father, and its children to the defender.
To simplify the analysis, we also assume that the accessed
bot ratio, A, is a power of 0.5 and all exposed nodes are dif-
ferent nodes. We then calculate the average percentages of
exposed bots by random detection and targeted detection.
Since from Corollary 1 a randomly selected node has
approximately one child, the average percentage of bots
that can be exposed by random detection is then
DR = 3A. (25)
For targeted detection, since the nodes with the largest
number of children are chosen and the number of chil-
dren follows asymptotically a geometric distribution with
parameter 0.5 as shown in Corollary 2,
A =
∑
i≥d cn(i) =
∑∞
i=d
(
1
2
)i+1
=
(
1
2
)d
, (26)
where d is the smallest number of children of accessed
nodes. That is, d = − log2A. Therefore, the average per-
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Fig. 11. Random and targeted detection.
centage of exposed nodes by targeted detection is
DT =
∑∞
i=d (2 + i) · cn(i) = (d+ 3)
(
1
2
)d
= A(3− log2A).
(27)
Compared with random detection, targeted detection can
expose (−A log2A)×nmore nodes. For example, ifA =
1
64 ,
on average random detection can detect 4.69% of nodes,
whereas targeted detection can expose 14.06% of bots.
We then extend our simulation in Section 4.1 to study the
effectiveness of random and targeted detection strategies.
Fig. 11 shows the simulation results over 100 independent
runs for both strategies, as well as the analytical results
from Equations (25) and (27), when A = 164 ,
1
32 , and
1
16 . It
can be seen that the analytical results slightly overestimate
the exposed host percentage. This is because in our analysis
we ignore the case that two exposed nodes can be duplicate.
Fig. 11 also demonstrates that targeted detection performs
much better than random detection. For example, in our
simulation, when A = 3.125%, 9.10% of the bots are
exposed under random detection, whereas 22.36% of the
bots are detected under targeted detection. Therefore, when
a small portion of bots are examined, the botnets formed
by worm infection are robust to random detection, but are
relatively vulnerable to targeted detection.
5.2 A Countermeasure by Future Botnets
To counteract the targeted detection method, an intuitive
way for botnets is to limit the maximum number of children
for each node. That is, set a small number m. Once an
infected host has compromised m other hosts, this host
stops scanning. In this way, there is no node with a large
number of children. Moreover, the infected hosts can self-
stop scanning, potentially reducing the worm traffic [32].
To analyze the robustness of such botnets against tar-
geted detection, we extend Corollary 2 to obtain an approx-
imated distribution of the number of children in a botnet
with the countermeasure:
cn(i) =
{ (
1
2
)i+1
, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,m− 1(
1
2
)m
, i = m.
(28)
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Fig. 12. A worm countermeasure via limiting the maximum number of children.
The distribution is based on the observation that those
nodes having more than m children in a botnet without
the countermeasure can now have only m children. Hence,
the expected percentage of exposed nodes under targeted
detection can be calculated:
D′T =
{
(m+ 2) · A, A ≤
(
1
2
)m
A(3 − log2A)−
(
1
2
)m
, A >
(
1
2
)m
.
(29)
Compared with DT in Equation (27), D
′
T is smaller. This
means that under the countermeasure the number of ex-
posed nodes can be reduced significantly. For example,
when m = 3 and A = 164 , DT =
9
64 , and D
′
T =
5
64 .
We then extend our simulation in Section 5.1 to simulate
the worm tree generated using the above countermeasure
and evaluate its performance against targeted detection.
Fig. 12(a) shows the distribution of the number of children
when m = 2, 3, 4, and 5. It can be seen that except for
m = 2, cn(i) is well approximated by Equation (28). For
m = 2, since an infected host stops scanning when it has
hit two vulnerable hosts, leaves in the worm tree have
more chances to recruit a child. Fig. 12(b) demonstrates
the expected percentage of exposed nodes (i.e., D′T ), when
A = 164 ,
1
32 , and
1
16 , and m = 2, 3, 4, and 5. It can
be seen that D′T follows approximately the analytical re-
sults in Equation (29). Moreover, the expected percentage
of exposed nodes under the countermeasure is reduced
significantly. For example, when A = 132 , the percentage
is reduced from 22.36% without the countermeasure to
19.80%, 15.99%, 12.58%, and 9.38% when m = 5, 4, 3, and
2, respectively.
On the other hand, since not every infected host keeps
scanning the targets, the countermeasure can potentially
slow down the speed of worm infection. Thus, we also
simulate the propagation speed of worms that limit the
maximum number of children and plot the results in Fig.
12(c) for m = 2, 3, 4, and 5, as well as the original worm
without the countermeasure. It can be seen that except for
m = 2, the worm does not slow down much. But even
when m = 2, the worm can infect most vulnerable hosts
within 17 hours. Moreover, Fig.s 12(b) and (c) demonstrate
the tradeoff between the efficiency of worm infection and
the robustness of the formed botnet topology. That is, a
worm with the countermeasure spreads slower, but the
resulting botnet is more robust against targeted detection.
6 RELATED WORK
Since the Code Red worm in 2001, Internet worms have
been an active research topic. Many mathematical models
have been developed to characterize the spread of worms,
estimate worm behaviors, and contain worm propagation.
Most models, however, have focused on the macro-level
behavior of worm infection. Specifically, different analytical
approaches have been applied to study the total number
of infected hosts over time [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [2],
[27]. For example, Staniford et al. used a simple differential
equation to estimate the global propagation speed of the
Code Red v2 worm [8], whereas Rohloff et al. applied a
stochastic model to reflect the variation of the number of
infected hosts at the early stage of worm infection [11]. The
models of the micro-level of worm infection, however, have
been investigated little. In this paper, we apply probabilistic
modeling methods and reveal some key micro-level infor-
mation, such as the infection ability of individual hosts and
the underlying botnet topology formed by worm infection.
Some efforts have been focused on studying the “who
infects whom” information or the worm infection sequence
[30], [33], [31], [34]. Different from our work, the prior work
investigates the details of the random number generator
of worm propagation [30] or infers the worm infection
sequence through the observations of network telescopes
[33], [34]. Moreover, Sellke et al. applied a branching process
to study the effectiveness of a containment strategy [35].
They assume that the total number of scans of an infected
host is bounded. As a result, the worm tree studied in their
work is fundamentally different from the one in our work.
Botnets have become the top threat to the Internet in
recent years. It has been shown that in current botnets,
worm infection is still a main tool for recruiting new bots
or collecting network information, and random scanning
has been widely used [3]. Moreover, botnets are rapidly
transiting from IRC systems to P2P systems. In [36], Wang et
al. gave a systematic study on P2P-based botnets; whereas
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in [14], Dagon et al. surveyed different P2P-based botnet
topologies, such as random graphs and power-law topolo-
gies. Several methods have been proposed to construct P2P-
based botnets through worm infection and re-infection [4],
[5].
Modeling the topology generation process has been an
active research area. For example, Baraba´si et al. developed
the well-known Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model and used a
mean-field approach to characterize the growth of a topol-
ogy with both preferential attachment and uniform attach-
ment [22], [23]. Moreover, two exact mathematical models
have been studied for the BA model [37], [38]. From the
theoretical aspect, our proposed worm tree is similar to the
random tree. For example, Devroye used the records theory
to derive the distribution of the level of a random ordered
tree in [39]. Compared with these theoretical efforts, our
work studies a very different problem (i.e., botnets formed
by worm infection) and uses a very different approach (i.e.,
probabilistic modeling).
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we attempt to capture the key characteris-
tics of the Internet worm infection family tree and apply
them to bot detection. We have shown analytically and
empirically that for the infection tree formed by a wide
class of worms, the number of children asymptotically has
a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5; and the gener-
ation closely follows a Poisson distribution with parameter
En[G] (i.e., Hn− 1). As a result, on average half of infected
hosts never compromise any target, over 98% of nodes
have no more than five children, and a small portion of
hosts have a large number of children. Moreover, the aver-
age path length of the worm tree increases approximately
logarithmically with the number of nodes. We have also
demonstrated empirically that similar observations can be
found in localized-scanning worms. We have then applied
the observations to bot detection and found that targeted
detection is an efficient way to expose bots in a botnet.
However, we have also pointed out that a simple counter-
measure by future botnets can weaken the performance of
targeted detection, without greatly slowing down the speed
of worm infection.
As part of our ongoing work, we plan to study in more
depth efficient methods against future botnets and relax our
assumptions to include more worm dynamics. For example,
we are studying the effect of user defenses on the worm tree
[40].
APPENDIX 1: PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We apply z-transform to derive the expectation and the
variance of the number of children. First, note that Corol-
lary 1 holds for n = 1 and 2. Next, when n ≥ 3, we define
z-transform
Xn(z) =
∑n−1
i=0 cn(i)z
−i. (30)
Setting cn−1(−1) = 1, we can transform Theorem 2 to
cn(i) =
n−2
n
cn−1(i) +
1
n
cn−1(i − 1), 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, (31)
when n ≥ 3. Then, putting Equation (31) into Equation (30),
we can obtain the difference equation of z-transform
Xn(z) =
(
1
n
z−1 + n−2
n
)
Xn−1(z) +
1
n
. (32)
Note that En[C] = −
dXn(z)
dz
|z=1 and Xn−1(1) = 1, which
leads to
En[C] =
n−1
n
En−1[C] +
1
n
. (33)
Since E2[C] =
1
2 , we can show by induction that
En[C] =
n−1
n
. (34)
Moreover, En[C
2] = d
dz
[
z dXn(z)
dz
]
|z=1 yields
En[C
2] = n−1
n
En−1[C
2] + 2
n
En−1[C] +
1
n
(35)
= n−1
n
En−1[C
2] + 3n−5
n2
. (36)
Thus, we can use E2[C
2] = 12 to prove by induction that
En[C
2] = 2 + (n−1)(n−2)
n2
− 2Hn
n
, (37)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
is the n-th harmonic number [20].
Therefore,
Varn[C] = En[C
2]− E2n[C] (38)
= 2− n−1
n2
− 2Hn
n
. (39)
APPENDIX 2: PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
It is already known that c(0) = 12 . When i ≥ 1, this
corollary follows readily from Equation (13). Since n→∞,
cn−1(i) = cn(i) = c(i), which yields
c(i) = n−2
n
c(i) + 1
n
c(i− 1). (40)
That is,
c(i) = 12c(i− 1), i ≥ 1. (41)
Hence, from c(0) = 12 , we can recursively obtain
c(i) =
(
1
2
)i+1
, i ≥ 0. (42)
APPENDIX 3: PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Similar to the proof of Corollary 1, we apply z-transform to
derive the expectation and the variance of the generation.
First, note that Corollary 3 holds for n = 1 and 2. Next,
when n ≥ 3, we define z-transform
Yn(z) =
∑n−1
j=0 gn(j)z
−j. (43)
Putting Equation (18) into Equation (43), we can obtain the
difference equation of z-transform
Yn(z) =
(
1
n
z−1 + n−1
n
)
Yn−1(z). (44)
Note that En[G] = −
dYn(z)
dz
|z=1 and Yn−1(1) = 1, which
leads to
En[G] = En−1[G] +
1
n
. (45)
Since E2[G] =
1
2 , we can show by induction that
En[G] = Hn − 1. (46)
13
Moreover, En[G
2] = d
dz
[
z dYn(z)
dz
]
|z=1 yields
En[G
2] = En−1[G
2] + 2
n
En−1[G] +
1
n
. (47)
Therefore, combining Equations (45) and (47) gives
Varn[G] = En[G
2]− E2n[G]
= En−1[G
2] + 1
n
(2En−1[G] + 1)
−(En−1[G] +
1
n
)2
= Varn−1[G] +
1
n
− 1
n2
. (48)
Thus, we can use Var2[G] =
1
4 to prove by induction that
Varn[G] = Hn −Hn,2, (49)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
and Hn,2 =
∑n
i=1
1
i2
.
APPENDIX 4: PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
We prove this corollary by applying z-transform. If a
random variable X follows a Poisson distribution with
parameter λ,
Pr(X = k) =
λk
k!
e−λ, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (50)
Using z-transform, we have
X(z) =
∞∑
k=0
Pr(X = k)z−k = eλ(z
−1−1). (51)
Meanwhile, using Equation (18) in Theorem 3, we find the
z-transform of gn(j)
Yn(z) =
∑n−1
j=0 gn(j)z
−j =
(
1 + z
−1−1
n
)
Yn−1(z). (52)
Note that when x → 0, ex ≈ 1 + x. Thus, when n is very
large, 1 + z
−1−1
n
≈ exp((z−1 − 1)/n). That is,
Yn(z) ≈ e
z−1−1
n Yn−1(z). (53)
Using Y1(z) = 1, we can recursively obtain
Yn(z) ≈ e
(z−1−1)
∑n
i=2
1
i = e(Hn−1)(z
−1
−1). (54)
Therefore, by comparing Equations (51) and (54), gn(j) can
be approximated by the Poisson distribution with parame-
ter Hn − 1 as in Equation (21).
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